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Abstract. The paper concerns a model of influence in which agents make their decisions on a
certain issue. We assume that each agent is inclined to make a particular decision, but due to
a possible influence of the others, his final decision may be different from his initial inclination.
Since in reality the influence does not necessarily stop after one step, but may iterate, we present
a model which allows us to study the dynamic of influence. An innovative and important ele-
ment of the model with respect to other studies of this influence framework is the introduction
of weights reflecting the importance that one agent gives to the others. These importance weights
can be positive, negative or equal to zero, which corresponds to the stimulation of the agent by
the ‘weighted’ one, the inhibition, or the absence of relation between the two agents in question,
respectively. The exhortation obtained by an agent is defined by the weighted sum of the opinions
received by all agents, and the updating rule is based on the sign of the exhortation. The use of
continuous variables permits the application of differential equations systems to the analysis of the
convergence of agents’ decisions in long-time. We study the dynamic of some influence functions
introduced originally in the discrete model, e.g., the majority and guru influence functions, but
the approach allows the study of new concepts, like e.g. the weighted majority function. In the
dynamic framework, we describe necessary and sufficient conditions for an agent to be follower of
a coalition, and for a set to be the boss set or the approval set of an agent.
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1 Introduction
The phenomenon of influence between individuals or, more broadly, influence of a group
of agents on an individual, is studied carefully in numerous works, e.g., in psychology,
sociology, economics, physics and mathematics. The economics literature offers several
surveys of different models of influence and of different approaches to this phenomenon;
see, e.g., Jackson (2008), Grabisch and Rusinowska (2010c), Rusinowska (2010).
⋆ Emmanuel Maruani was a student at the Universite´ de Paris 1 and Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chausse´es
when this research has been conducted. Michel Grabisch and Agnieszka Rusinowska acknowledge support by
the National Agency for Research (Agence Nationale de la Recherche), Reference: ANR-09-BLAN-0321-01.
Some of the works on influence and interaction, in particular in the game theoretical
literature, are one-step models. In reality, however, the influence does not necessarily stop
after one step, but may iterate. Consequently, in order to study the iteration of influence,
different dynamic models of influence are proposed by sociologists and economists. One
of the leading works of opinion formation is introduced in DeGroot (1974). In that model,
individuals start with initial opinions on a subject and place some (nonnegative) weights
on the current beliefs of other agents in forming their own beliefs for the next period.
These beliefs are updated over time. Several other authors study the DeGroot model and
propose its generalizations, in particular, models in which the updating of beliefs can vary
in time and circumstances; see e.g. Berger (1981), DeMarzo et al. (2003), Krause (2000),
Lorenz (2005), Friedkin and Johnsen (1990, 1997), Jackson (2008), Golub and Jackson
(2010). A related dynamic framework of influence is also presented in Asavathiratham
(2000), Asavathiratham et al. (2001) and Koster et al. (2010).
A cooperative approach to influence is presented in Hu and Shapley (2003a,b), where
the command structure is applied to model players’ interaction relations by simple games.
Boss sets and approval sets for a player are defined, and based on these sets a simple game
called the command game for the player is constructed. Also the concept of command
function is defined. The authors introduce an authority distribution over an organization
and define the authority equilibrium equation. In particular, they consider multi-step
commands, where commands can be implemented through command channels.
The present paper is related to another framework of influence originally introduced
in Hoede and Bakker (1982). In the original one-step model, agents have to make their
acceptance-rejection decision on a certain issue. Each agent has an inclination to say
either ‘yes’ or ‘no’, but due to a possible influence of the other agents, his final decision
(‘yes’ or ‘no’) may be different from his initial inclination. Refinements and generaliza-
tions of this model are presented in several works. Grabisch and Rusinowska (2010a)
investigate some tools to analyze influence in this framework. In particular, they define
the influence indices to measure the influence of a coalition on an agent, introduce several
influence functions and study their properties, and investigate the concept of a follower
of a coalition. In Grabisch and Rusinowska (2010b) the yes-no model of influence is gen-
eralized to a framework in which each agent has an ordered set of possible actions, and
in Grabisch and Rusinowska (2011b) the model is extended to a continuum of actions.
Grabisch and Rusinowska (2009) compare the influence model with the framework of
simple games called command games (Hu and Shapley (2003b,a)). It is shown that the
presented framework of influence is more general than the framework of command games.
In Grabisch and Rusinowska (2011a) the exact relations between the key concepts of the
influence model and the framework of command games are established. There are also
some studies of the dynamic of influence in the model mentioned above, i.e., the model
of initial inclinations and final decisions. In Grabisch and Rusinowska (2011c) the yes-no
model with a single step of mutual influence is generalized to a dynamic model of influ-
ence based on aggregation functions. The decision process in which the mutual influence
does not stop after one step but iterates, and the convergence of an influence function are
studied. In particular, the authors investigate stochastic influence functions and apply
Markov chains theory to the analysis of such functions.
The aim of the present paper is to apply another approach proposed in Maruani (2010)
to study the dynamic of influence. We propose a dynamic model in which an agent gives
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a certain importance, reflected by a weight, to other agents in making his final decision.
Such a weight might be positive, negative, or equal to zero, which corresponds to the
stimulation of the agent by the ‘weighted’ one, the inhibition, and the absence of relation
between the agents in question, respectively. Furthermore, we define the exhortation of
an agent which is the weighted sum of the opinions that the agent receives from all
agents. The opinions of the agents are updated over time and the updating rule is based
on the sign of the exhortation. The use of continuous variables permits the application
of differential equations systems to the analysis of the convergence of agents’ decisions
in long-time. We study the dynamic of some influence functions introduced originally
in the discrete model, e.g., the majority and guru influence functions, but the approach
allows the study of new concepts, like e.g. the weighted majority function. In the dynamic
framework, we describe necessary and sufficient conditions for an agent to be follower of a
coalition, and for a set to be the boss set or the approval set of an agent. By applying the
approach based on differential equations to the influence model, we recover the results
of the discrete model on classical influence functions, and the results on the boss and
approval sets for command games equivalent to some selected influence functions.
What are the innovative elements of the model with respect to other studies of the
influence framework, and what are the improvements and advantages that the model
brings to the analysis of influence? First of all, we like to stress that to the best of our
knowledge the approach based on differential equations has not been used in the influence
frameworks so far. We see two original features of the present model compared to our
previous studies as well as to other ones.
First, the main aim is the analysis of the dynamic aspects of influence, where the
opinion of agents is evolving in time, instead of considering as in our studies so far that
influence stops after one step. Generally speaking, there are two main streams in analyzing
the dynamic aspects of a system. The first one is to model the system with a set of states,
and assume a probabilistic transition between states. This leads to stachastic processes,
and in particular, Markovian processes. In a recent paper, Grabisch and Rusinowska
(2011c) follow this line and provide a general analysis of convergence of the dynamic yes-
no model of influence, assuming that agents update their opinion by aggregating opinions
of the other agents. The second stream is to establish a set of differential equations
governing the evolution of the system. This is the way we follow in this paper. We believe
that new insights in the analysis of influence can be brought by this approach. This paper
constitutes a first step in this direction.
Its second original feature lies in incorporating the importance weights of positive
and negative signs. This allows to model the positive (direct) and negative (opposite)
influence at the same time, and in a very simple way. The yes-no model introduced
in Grabisch and Rusinowska (2010a) and its generalization to the multi-action model
presented in Grabisch and Rusinowska (2010b) are one-step models for which the authors
define the indices of positive and negative influence separately, and they do not assume
any weights of importance. The same remark holds for our study of command games
in Grabisch and Rusinowska (2009) and Grabisch and Rusinowska (2011a). Grabisch
and Rusinowska (2011c) do provide a general analysis of convergence of the dynamic
yes-no model of influence in which every agent updates his opinion according to his
aggregation function. However, the nondecreasingness assumption in the definition of
an aggregation function implies positive influence, and therefore the model based on
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aggregation functions does not cover a framework of negative influence. The model of
DeGroot (1974) and its modifications (for an overview, see e.g., Jackson (2008)) assume
that the opinion of an agent is a number in [0, 1] and the aggregation is done through
a weighted arithmetic mean (convex combination). Players place weights on the current
beliefs of the others in forming their own beliefs for the next period, but these weights are
nonnegative and no inhibition possibility is incorporated in the model. The convergence
of the process (of the updating/interaction matrix) is studied.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 the main concepts of the influence
model in question and the framework of command games are presented. In Section 3 we
introduce the dynamic model of influence. The dynamic of selected influence functions
is studied in Section 4. Section 5 concerns followers in the dynamic model and under
selected influence functions. The analysis of the dynamic model in terms of command
games, in particular, the determination of the boss and approval sets in the presented
framework is delivered in Section 6. Concluding remarks are given in Section 7.
2 The model of influence and command games
2.1 Main concepts of the influence model
Let us start by mentioning some notations used in the paper. (1, 1, . . . , 1) ∈ {−1,+1}n is
denoted by 1N , (−1,−1, . . . ,−1) ∈ {−1,+1}
n by −1N , and mixed cases by (−1N\S, 1S).
For every real number x ∈ R, ⌊x⌋ denotes the largest integer not greater than x. By δij
we denote the Kronecker delta, i.e., δij = 1 if i = j, and 0 otherwise.
In this section we recapitulate main concepts of the one-step yes-no model of influence
investigated in Grabisch and Rusinowska (2010a). We consider a social network with the
set of all players (agents, voters) denoted by N := {1, ..., n}. Each player has to make an
acceptance-rejection decision concerning a certain issue, and he has an inclination to say
either ‘yes’ (denoted by +1) or ‘no’ (denoted by −1). An inclination vector is denoted by
I = (I1, ..., In), where Ik ∈ {−1,+1} indicates the inclination of agent k, for each k ∈ N .
For any I ∈ {−1,+1}n, I+ denotes the set of players with the positive inclination
I+ := {k ∈ N : Ik = +1}.
Moreover, for any S ⊆ N , we denote by UIS the set of all inclination vectors under which
all members of S have the same inclination
UIS := {I ∈ {−1,+1}
n : ∀k, j ∈ S [Ik = Ij]}.
In particular, UIk = {−1,+1}
n for any k ∈ N . We denote by IS the value Ik for some
k ∈ S, I ∈ UIS.
It is assumed that agents may influence each other in the network, and due to the
influences the final decision of an agent may be different from his original inclination.
Formally, each inclination vector I ∈ {−1,+1}n is transformed into a decision vector
B(I) = (B1(I), ..., Bn(I)), where B : {−1,+1}
n → {−1,+1}n, I 7→ B(I) is the influence
function1, and Bk(I) indicates the decision made by agent k, for each k ∈ N . The set of
all influence functions is denoted by B.
1 We can also speak of the influence function of agent k, Bk : {−1,+1}
n → {−1,+1}, I 7→ Bk(I), for each k ∈ N .
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One of the key concepts of the influence model is the concept of follower. An agent is
said to be follower of a coalition if he always decides according to the inclination of that
coalition, assuming that the coalition in question is unanimously inclined. Formally, for
∅ 6= S ⊆ N and B ∈ B, the set of followers of S under B is therefore defined as
FB(S) := {j ∈ N : ∀I ∈ UIS [Bj(I) = IS]}.
We recapitulate three particular influence functions that have been introduced and
investigated in Grabisch and Rusinowska (2010a):
– Let n ≥ t > ⌊n
2
⌋. The majority influence function Maj[t] ∈ B is defined by
Maj[t](I) :=
{
1N , if |I
+| ≥ t
−1N , if |I
+| < t
, ∀I ∈ {−1,+1}n.
According to the majority influence function if a majority of players has the positive
inclination, then all agents decide +1, otherwise all decide −1. For each S ⊆ N , the
set of followers under the majority function is equal to
FMaj[t](S) =
{
N, if |S| ≥ t
∅, if |S| < t,
(1)
i.e., everybody follows a coalition with a cardinality of at least t, and nobody follows
a coalition with less than t members.
– Let k˜ ∈ N be a particular player called the guru. The guru influence function Gur[k˜] ∈
B is defined by
Gur
[k˜]
j (I) := Ik˜, ∀I ∈ {−1,+1}
n, ∀j ∈ N.
Hence, according to this function, when a guru exists, every agent follows the guru.
For each S ⊆ N , the set of followers under the guru function is given by
F
Gur[k˜]
(S) =
{
N, if k˜ ∈ S
∅, if k˜ /∈ S.
(2)
In other words, all agents follow a coalition containing the guru, and nobody follows
a coalition without the guru.
– The identity function Id ∈ B depicts the absence of any influence and is defined by
Id(I) := I, ∀I ∈ {−1,+1}n.
Moreover, we have for each S ⊆ N ,
FId(S) = S, (3)
which means that all members of a coalition and only them follow that coalition.
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2.2 Command games and equivalence with influence functions
Next, we present some of the main concepts concerning command games that have orig-
inally been introduced by Hu and Shapley (2003a,b).
Let N = {1, ..., n} be the set of agents (players, voters). With each k ∈ N , two
collections of coalitions, the so called boss set and approval set are associated. Hu and
Shapley (2003a) define these sets as follows. For k ∈ N and S ⊆ N \ k:
– S is a boss set for k if S determines the choice of k;
– S is an approval set for k if k can act with the approval of S.
It is assumed that any superset (in N \ k) of a boss set is a boss set. For each k ∈ N , a
simple game (N,Wk) called the command game for k is created, with the set of winning
coalitions given by
Wk := {S : S is a boss set for k} ∪ {S ∪ k : S is a boss or approval set for k}.
We recover the boss sets for agent k
Bossk = {S ⊆ N \ k : S ∈ Wk} =Wk ∩ 2
N\k
and the approval sets for k
Appk = {S ⊆ N \ k : S ∪ k ∈ Wk but S /∈ Wk}.
Obviously, Bossk ∩Appk = ∅. Given the set of command games Ω = {(N,Wk) : k ∈ N},
for any coalition S ⊆ N , the command function ω(S) is defined as the set of all members
that are commandable by S:
ω(S) := {k ∈ N : S ∈ Wk}.
In Grabisch and Rusinowska (2009) the model of influence is applied to the framework
of command games and the relations between these two frameworks are shown; see also
Grabisch and Rusinowska (2011a). We present one of these relations, i.e., the equivalence
between command games and (command) influence functions.
Let Ω = {(N,Wk) : k ∈ N} be a set of command games, ω(S) be a set of agents
commandable by S, and FB(S) denote the set of followers of S under an influence function
B. The influence function B and the set of command games Ω are said to be equivalent
if FB ≡ ω, i.e., if for each coalition S ⊆ N , the set of followers of S under the influence
function B and the set of agents commandable by S under Ω coincide.
In Grabisch and Rusinowska (2009) we construct command games equivalent to the
influence functions recapitulated in Section 2.1 and determine boss and approval sets for
these command games:
(i) Let n ≥ t > ⌊n
2
⌋ andMaj[t] ∈ B be the majority influence function and let {(N,WMaj
[t]
k ) :
k ∈ N} be a set of command games given by
WMaj
[t]
k = {S ⊆ N : |S| ≥ t}, ∀k ∈ N.
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The majority influence function Maj[t] and the set of command games {(N,WMaj
[t]
k ) :
k ∈ N} are equivalent. In other words, the command games in which winning coalitions
for each player are the ones with the cardinality at least t, n ≥ t > ⌊n
2
⌋, are equivalent
to Maj[t]. Moreover, we have for n > 2, n ≥ t > ⌊n
2
⌋, and k ∈ N
BossMaj
[t]
k = {S ⊆ N : |S| ≥ t ∧ k /∈ S} (4)
AppMaj
[t]
k = {S ⊆ N : |S| = t− 1 ∧ k /∈ S}. (5)
In particular, for t = n, k ∈ N ,
BossMaj
[t]
k = ∅, App
Maj[t]
k = N \ k.
(ii) Let Gur[k˜] ∈ B be the guru function with the guru k˜ ∈ N and let {(N,WGur
[k˜]
k ) : k ∈ N}
be a set of command games given by
WGur
[k˜]
k = {S ⊆ N : k˜ ∈ S}, ∀k ∈ N.
The guru function Gur[k˜] and the set of command games {(N,WGur
[k˜]
k ) : k ∈ N} are
equivalent. Hence, the command games in which winning coalitions for each player are
the coalitions containing a certain player k˜, are equivalent to the guru function Gur[k˜]
with the guru k˜. Moreover,
BossGur
[k˜]
k˜
= ∅, AppGur
[k˜]
k˜
= 2N\k˜ (6)
BossGur
[k˜]
k = {S ⊆ N : k˜ ∈ S ∧ k /∈ S}, App
Gur[k˜]
k = ∅, for k 6= k˜. (7)
(iii) Let Id ∈ B be the identity function and let {(N,W Idk ) : k ∈ N} be a set of command
games given by
W Idk = {S ⊆ N : k ∈ S}, ∀k ∈ N.
The identity function Id and the set of command games {(N,W Idk ) : k ∈ N} are
equivalent. This means that the command games, in which for each player k winning
coalitions for k are the coalitions containing k, are equivalent to the identity function.
We have also for each k ∈ N
BossIdk = ∅, App
Id
k = 2
N\k. (8)
3 The dynamic model of influence
3.1 Description of the model and stable states
In order to analyze the dynamic aspects of influence, we consider the following model
introduced originally in Maruani (2010).
Let N = {1, 2, ..., n} denote the set of agents. We are interested in the influence of all
n agents on a player i ∈ N . Let ej denote the inclination of agent j ∈ N , where ej = ±1.
Agent i gives to agent j a certain importance which is reflected by a weight pij ∈ [−1, 1].
pij > 0 corresponds to the stimulation of i by j, pij < 0 corresponds to the inhibition,
7
and pij = 0 means the absence of relation. The state (inclination) ej will contribute to
the decision of agent i with the weight cij = pijej.
What is the interpretation of the contribution weights cij? Obviously, they can be
positive, negative or zero, which means that if player i would consult only the state ej,
then i’s decision would be ‘yes’, ‘no’ or would be equal to i’s state, respectively. More
precisely, suppose that agent i when forming his decision does not take into account
the inclination of agent j, i.e., pij = 0. Then obviously pijej = 0, independently of the
inclination of agent j, which reflects no contribution of j’s state to i’s decision. Suppose
that j stimulates the decision of agent i, i.e., pij > 0. Then the weight of the contribution
of j’s state to the decision of agent i has the same sign as ej, which means that i’s decision
would be as the state of j when i considered only the state ej. Moreover, the higher pij the
more ej contributes to i’s decision being the same as ej when all players are considered.
Suppose now that j inhibits or discourages the decision of agent i, i.e., pij < 0. Then
the weight of the contribution of j’s state to the decision of agent i has the opposite
sign than ej, which means that i’s decision would be opposite to the state of j when i
considered only the state ej. In particular, if j is inclined negatively, then i’s decision
would be positive when consulting only ej. The higher the absolute value of pij the more
ej contributes to i’s decision being opposite to ej when all players are considered.
Since the players interact, every agent consults the states of all agents, and based
on the importance weights he aggregates all contributions to his decision. Hence, the
exhortation Ei obtained by agent i ∈ N is defined by the weighted sum of the inclinations
of all agents, or saying differently, by the weighted sum of the opinions that i receives
from the agents (including his own opinion):
Ei =
∑
j∈N
cij =
∑
j∈N
pijej. (9)
Figure 1 presents the idea of the exhortation.
ej
ei ek
pikek
pijejpjiei
piiei
Ei = pijej + pikek + piiei
Fig. 1. The exhortation
The updating rule is the following. If Ei > 0, then agent i goes to the state +1. If
Ei < 0, then he goes to the state −1, and if Ei = 0, then i stays in his present state.
The influence function Bi of agent i ∈ N is defined by
Bi(e) = sgn(Ei), where e = (e1, . . . , en) and sign(Ei) =

1, if Ei > 0
−1, if Ei < 0
ei, if Ei = 0
(10)
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Remark 1 In this dynamic model, we can express the influence functions recapitulated
in Section 2.1 as follows:
(i) The majority influence function with t = ⌊n
2
⌋ + 1 in which every agent plays a role
can be represented by pij =
1
n
.
(ii) The guru function with the guru k˜ in which every agent is influenced only by the guru
can be represented by pij = 0 for each j 6= k˜ and pik˜ = 1.
(iii) The identity function in which every agent influences only himself can be represented
by pij = δij.
Stable states of the system satisfy e
(k+1)
i = e
(k)
i for each i ∈ N , starting from a certain
k, where k is the number of iteration and e
(k)
i denotes the inclination (state) of i at time
k. This means that the state ei and the exhortation Ei have the same sign, and therefore
eiEi > 0. In other words, the stable states satisfy the following inequality:∑
j∈N
pijeiej > 0 for each i ∈ N.
The evolution of the population can be expressed by
e
(k+1)
i = Bi(e
(k)
1 , e
(k)
2 , . . . , e
(k)
j , . . . , e
(k)
n ) (11)
where Bi is the influence function of voter i ∈ N . A stable state satisfies therefore
e
(k)
i = Bi(e
(k)
1 , e
(k)
2 , . . . , e
(k)
j , . . . , e
(k)
n ).
An obvious way to get stability is to forbid any relation between agents, i.e., to assign
the weights as pij = δij .
3.2 Dynamic of the model in the continuous framework
Let us consider an extension of the dynamic influence model to the continuous framework;
see also Maruani (2010). The influence function remains
e
(k+1)
i = sgn
(
E
(k)
i
)
which together with E
(k)
i =
∑
j∈N pije
(k)
j can be written as
e
(k+1)
i − e
(k)
i
(k + 1)− k
= sgn
(∑
j
pije
(k)
j
)
− e
(k)
i . (12)
For a small time step, we can make the approximation
e
(k+1)
i − e
(k)
i
(k + 1)− k
≈
dei
dt
(13)
and also the approximation
sgn
(∑
j
pijej
)
≈ tanh
(
a
∑
j
pijej
)
(14)
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where the parameter a controls the tendency towards the function sgn. This approxi-
mation keeps the properties of the function sgn that are essential for our analysis: it is
increasing and bounded between −1 and 1 and nullifies in 0.
From (12), (13), and (14), in order to study the dynamic of the model, we need to
solve the following system:
dei
dt
+ ei = tanh
(
a
∑
j
pijej
)
, i = 1, . . . , n (15)
and then put ei = sgn [ei(t)]. In Section 4 we apply this dynamic approach of differential
equations to classical influence functions. The results that we present have been originally
shown in Maruani (2010).
4 The dynamic of selected influence functions
4.1 The majority influence function with t = ⌊n
2
⌋+ 1
As mentioned in Remark 1(i), the majority influence function with t = ⌊n
2
⌋ + 1 can be
represented by the weights pij =
1
n
. The system (15) of differential equations that we
need to solve is therefore
dei
dt
+ ei = tanh
(
a
n
∑
j
ej
)
, i = 1, . . . , n. (16)
The dynamic approach allows for the analysis of the influence model introduced in
Grabisch and Rusinowska (2011b) in which agents have a continuum of actions, i.e., the
set of all inclinations is equal to an interval [x, y], where x, y ∈ R.
Lemma 1 For a > 1, the differential equation dx
dt
+ x = tanh(ax) has an unstable fixed
point in 0 and another stable fixed point.
Proof: In the equation
dx
dt
+ x = tanh(ax)
we put ax = y. Hence,
dy
dt
+ y = a tanh(y) =
1
p
tanh(y)
with p = 1
a
. The fixed points satisfy tanh(y) = py. There is always y = 0 and another
fixed point y0 iff p < 1 (a > 1). We are interested in the stability of fixed points. In the
neighborhood of y = 0
dy
dt
+ y =
1
p
tanh(y) ≈
y
p
dy
dt
+
p− 1
p
y = 0
y(t) = y(0) exp
1− p
p
t
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For 0 < p < 1 the origin is unstable.
In the neighborhood of y0, we put y(t) = y0 + ε(t)
dy
dt
+ y =
1
p
tanh(y)
dε
dt
+ y0 + ε(t) =
1
p
tanh (y0 + ε(t))
=
1
p
tanh(y0) + tanh (ε(t))
1 + tanh(y0) tanh (ε(t))
=
1
p
py0 + tanh (ε(t))
1 + py0 tanh (ε(t))
where we have used py0 = tanh(y0). A first order approximation yields
dε
dt
+ y0 + ε(t) ≈
1
p
py0 + ε(t)
1 + py0ε(t)
≈
1
p
[py0 + ε(t)] [1− py0ε(t)]
≈ y0 − py
2
0ε(t) +
ε(t)
p
and ultimately
dε
dt
+
(
1 + py20 −
1
p
)
ε(t) = 0
If
(
1 + py20 −
1
p
)
> 0, then the solution is the decreasing exponential and point y0 is
stable. Let us show that
(
1 + py20 −
1
p
)
> 0. Let
A = 1 + py20 −
1
p
py0 = tanh(y0)
A = 1 + y0 tanh(y0)−
y0
tanh(y0)
= 1 + y0
[
tanh(y0)−
1
tanh(y0)
]
= 1 + y0
[
tanh2(y0)− 1
tanh(y0)
]
= 1− y0
[
1
cosh2(y0) tanh(y0)
]
= 1− y0
[
1
cosh(y0) sinh(y0)
]
= 1−
2y0
sinh(2y0)
= 1−
u
sinh(u)
We have
sinh(u)
u
= 1 +
u2
3!
+
u4
5!
+ ...
sinh(u)
u
> 1 ⇒ 1−
u
sinh(u)
> 0.

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Proposition 1 If agents make their decisions according to the majority influence func-
tion with t = ⌊n
2
⌋+ 1, then the decision of each agent converges to the sign of the sum of
the agents’ inclinations.
Proof: Let us consider the system
dei
dt
+ ei = tanh
[
a
n
∑
j
ej(t)
]
, i = 1, . . . , n.
With εi =
a
n
ei, we have, for each i,
dεi
dt
+ εi =
a
n
tanh
[∑
j
εj(t)
]
Adding term by term the equations of the system, the sum S(t) =
∑
j εj(t) satisfies
dS
dt
+ S = a tanh [S(t)]
According to Lemma 1, S converges to a stable fixed point S∞, which satisfies for a > 1
S∞ = a tanh(S∞)
The system that we consider becomes
dεi
dt
+ εi =
a
n
tanh [S(t)] .
By changing the function εi(t) = Ei(t) exp(−t) (εi(0) = Ei(0)), we get the equation
dEi
dt
=
a
n
exp(t) tanh [S(t)]
whose general solution is
Ei(t) = Ei(0) +
a
n
∫ t
0
exp(u) tanh [S(u)] du
The solution for εi is therefore
εi(t) = εi(0) exp(−t) +
a
n
exp(−t)
∫ t
0
exp(u) tanh [S(u)] du (17)
We are interested in the asymptotic form of the solution. The first term of the right hand
side of (17) vanishes. Let us denote by ηi the second term, i.e.,
ηi(t) =
a
n
exp(−t)
∫ t
0
exp(u) tanh [S(u)] du
12
Let us fix for the moment some T . Then, for t > T we decompose the integral in two
terms
ηi(t) =
a
n
exp(−t)
[∫ T
0
exp(u) tanh [S(u)] du+
∫ t
T
exp(u) tanh [S(u)] du
]
= η
(1)
i (t) + η
(2)
i (t)
and consider successively the two components. We analyze the first term
η
(1)
i (t) =
a
n
exp(−t)
∫ T
0
exp(u) tanh [S(u)] du
The tanh is bounded by 1, so we have∣∣∣∣∫ T
0
exp(u) tanh [S(u)] du
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∫ T
0
exp(u)du = exp(T )− 1
Given T , exp(T )− 1 is a fixed number and we denote it by B. Then∣∣∣η(1)i (t)∣∣∣ ≤ aBn exp(−t)
and therefore
lim
t→∞
η
(1)
i (t) = 0
The second term is
η
(2)
i (t) =
a
n
exp(−t)
∫ t
T
exp(u) tanh [S(u)] du
For u large enough, which is the case, S(u) is close to S∞. By continuity tanh [S(u)] is
close to tanh (S∞), which is equal to
S∞
a
. It is then appropriate to choose T as follows.
Setting
tanh [S(u)] =
S∞
a
[1 + δ(u)]
introduces the function δ(u) which vanishes at infinity. The free parameter T is then
chosen such that for any given positive ε and for t > T , |δ(t)| < nε
|S∞|
. We have then
η
(2)
i (t) =
a
n
exp(−t)
∫ t
T
exp(u) tanh [S(u)] du
=
a
n
exp(−t)
∫ t
T
exp(u)
S∞
a
[1 + δ(u)] du
=
S∞
n
exp(−t)
∫ t
T
exp(u)du+
S∞
n
exp(−t)
∫ t
T
δ(u) exp(u)du
=
S∞
n
(1− exp(T − t)) + ϕ(t)
where the asymptotic value of the first term is S∞
n
, and the second term is
ϕ(t) =
S∞
n
exp(−t)
∫ t
T
δ(u) exp(u)du
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|ϕ(t)| ≤
S∞
n
exp(−t)
∫ t
T
exp(u)
nε
|S∞|
du
≤ ε exp(−t)
∫ t
T
exp(u)du
≤ ε
The asymptotic value of εi is then
S∞
n
, and the asymptotic value of
∑
j εj is
∑n
j=1
S∞
n
=
S∞. 
Remark 2 (The majority vote decreases costs)
The fixed points of the differential system dek
dt
= gk(e1, e2, ..., en), k = 1, . . . , n satisfy by
definition dek
dt
= 0, k = 1, . . . , n, which is equivalent to
∑
k
(
dek
dt
)2
= 0.
Let us suppose the existence of a function G of n variables such that for each k
gk(e1, e2, ..., en) = −
∂G
∂ek
and calculate
dG
dt
=
∑
k
∂G
∂ek
dek
dt
= −
∑
k
gk
dek
dt
= −
∑
k
(
dek
dt
)2
≤ 0
which means that G is decreasing in time and reaches its minimum when each dek
dt
= 0,
i.e., for the fixed point of the system. We have
dek
dt
+ ek = fk(e1, e2, ..., en) ⇒
dek
dt
= fk(e1, e2, ..., en)− ek (gk = fk − ek)
Let us apply this to our differential system (16), letting εk =
a
n
ek:
dεk
dt
=
a
n
tanh
[∑
j
εj(t)
]
− εk
(all f being identical). We multiply both sides of each differential equation by dεk
dt(
dεk
dt
)2
=
a
n
dεk
dt
tanh
[∑
j
εj(t)
]
− εk
dεk
dt
and obtain ∑
k
(
dεk
dt
)2
=
{
a
n
tanh
[∑
j
εj(t)
]}∑
k
dεk
dt
−
∑
k
εk
dεk
dt
With S(t) =
∑
k εk(t) we have then∑
k
(
dεk
dt
)2
=
a
n
dS
dt
tanh [S(t)]−
1
2
d
∑
k(εk)
2
dt
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Note that
dS
dt
tanh [S(t)] =
1
cosh [S(t)]
d
dt
cosh [S(t)] =
d
dt
ln {cosh [S(t)]}
Hence, up to some unessential additive constant, we get the cost function
G(ε1, ε2, ..., εn) =
1
2
∑
k
ε2k(t)−
a
n
ln
{
cosh
[∑
k
εk(t)
]}
.
4.2 The guru function and the identity function
As mentioned in Remark 1(ii), the guru function with the guru k˜ can be represented by
∀j 6= k˜, pij = 0, pik˜ = 1.
The system of differential equations given in (15) that we need to solve becomes
dei
dt
+ ei = tanh(aek˜), i = 1, . . . , n. (18)
One can see that, on the one hand, the guru evolves only according to its own in-
clinations, and on the other hand, for all the remaining agents the guru evolution acts
as a forcing term. The respective evolution equations of the agents differ only in their
respective initial values. Hence, the following Proposition 2 is coherent with the intuition:
Proposition 2 If agents make their decisions according to the guru function, then the
decision of each agent converges to the inclination of the guru.
Proof: Let g0 6= 0 be a stable fixed point of the equation
dy
dt
+y = a tanh(y) (it exists by
virtue of Lemma 1). This means that asymptotically (in long term) we can write, letting
g = ek˜ for simplicity:
g(t) = g0 + γ(t)
where pg0 = tanh(g0), p =
1
a
, and γ(t) converges to zero with t tending to infinity. There
exists t0 such that for t > t0, γ(t) <
ǫ
pg0
. For each agent i, we have
dei
dt
+ ei =
1
p
tanh[g(t)] =
1
p
tanh [g0 + γ(t)]
=
1
p
tanh(g0) + tanh [γ(t)]
1 + tanh(g0) tanh [γ(t)]
≈
1
p
pg0 + γ(t)
1 + pg0γ(t)
≈
1
p
[pg0 + γ(t)] [1− pg0γ(t)]
≈
1
p
(
pg0 − (pg0)
2 γ(t) + γ(t)
)
= g0 +Bγ(t)
where we used that 1
1+ǫ
= 1− ǫ (|ǫ| ≪ 1).
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The value B is not important. The change of the function ei(t) = g0 + zi(t) (the aim
is to show that zi(t) converges to 0) gives
dzi
dt
+ zi = Bγ(t)
We will show that limt→∞ zi(t) = 0. Let us consider the equation
dz
dt
+ z(t) = Bγ(t)
The homogeneous solution is
z(t) = z0 exp(−t)
For t > t0 the particular solution is of the form
z(t) = u(t) exp(−t)
and it must satisfy
dz
dt
+ z(t) =
du
dt
exp(−t)
du
dt
= Bγ(t) exp(t)
We have
u(t) = B
∫ t
t0
γ(u) exp(u)du
The general solution is therefore of the form
z(t) = z0 exp(−t) + u(t) exp(−t) = z0 exp(−t) + B exp(−t)
∫ t
t0
γ(u) exp(u)du
Asymptotically, the exponential disappears and
z(t) = B exp(−t)
∫ t
t0
γ(u) exp(u)du
Hence, ∣∣∣∣∫ t
t0
γ(u) exp(u)du
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣∣ ǫpg0
∫ t
t0
exp(u)du
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∫ t
t0
γ(u) exp(u)du
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ǫpg0 [exp(t)− exp(t0)]
and therefore
|z(t)| ≤
Bǫ
pg0
exp(−t) [exp(t)− exp(t0)] =
Bǫ
pg0
[1− exp(t0 − t)]
and
|z(t)| ≤
Bǫ
pg0
.
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Since this converges to zero, we have for each i,
ei(t) = g0 + zi(t)→ g0.

As mentioned in Remark 1(iii), the identity function can be represented by pij = δij .
The system of differential equations that we need to solve for each i is
dei
dt
+ ei = tanh(aei).
Proposition 3 If agents make their decisions according to the identity function, then
the decision of each agent converges to his own inclination.
Proof: Evident from Lemma 1. 
5 Followers in the dynamic model
As recapitulated in Section 2.1, followers of a coalition S are the agents who always
follow the inclination of S, assuming that S is unanimously inclined. The set of followers
of coalition S under the influence function B is therefore defined as
FB(S) := {i ∈ N : ∀e ∈ ES [Bi(e) = eS]},
where in our model, Bi(e) = sgn
(∑
j pijej
)
.
In order to determine the followers for every influence function B, first we consider a
particular case with S = {e1}. Agent i is the follower of S if and only if
∀e ∈ E, sgn
(∑
j
pijej
)
= sgn(e1)
⇔ ∀e ∈ E, e1
∑
j
pijej > 0
⇔ ∀e ∈ E, pi1 + e1
∑
j≥2
pijej > 0
⇔ pi1 >
∑
j≥2
|pij|
Proposition 4 Agent i is the follower of coalition S if and only if∑
j∈S
pij >
∑
j /∈S
|pij|.
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Proof: In the general case, agent i is the follower of S if and only if
∀e ∈ ES, sgn
(∑
j
pijej
)
= sgn(ek) = sgn(el) = ... for each ek, el ∈ S
⇔ ∀e ∈ ES, ek
∑
j
pijej > 0
⇔ ∀e ∈ ES,
∑
j∈S
pij + ek
∑
j /∈S
pijej > 0
⇔
∑
j∈S
pij >
∑
j /∈S
|pij|

Note that for |S| = 1, if pik < 0 for each i, then FB(ek) = ∅.
Proposition 4 gives a very simple condition to test whether an agent is a follower
of a coalition S: the algebraic sum of the weights (that is, negative influence acts as a
discounting factor) for the agents in S should be greater than the sum of the absolute
values of weights (that is, positive and negative influence are not distinguished) for the
other agents.
Let us apply Proposition 4 to the majority influence function with t = ⌊n
2
⌋ + 1. We
have pij =
1
n
for each i, j. For each S, agent i is the follower of coalition S if and only if
∑
j∈S
pij >
∑
j /∈S
|pij| ⇔
|S|
n
>
n− |S|
n
⇔ |S| >
n
2
.
This shows that in case of the majority influence function, the followers of S depend only
on the cardinality of S and
FMaj[t](S) =
{
N, if |S| > n
2
∅, if |S| ≤ n
2
which is coherent with (1).
Let player k˜ be the guru. We have then for each i
pij =
{
0 if j 6= k˜
1 if j = k˜.
Hence, ∑
j∈S
pij =
{
1 if k˜ ∈ S
0 if k˜ /∈ S
,
∑
j /∈S
|pij| =
{
0 if k˜ ∈ S
1 if k˜ /∈ S
and therefore ∑
j∈S
pij >
∑
j /∈S
|pij| ⇔ k˜ ∈ S. (19)
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This result shows that in case of the guru function, the followers of S depend only on the
presence of the guru in coalition S. We get then
F
Gur[k˜]
(S) =
{
N, if k˜ ∈ S
∅, if k˜ /∈ S
which is equal to (2).
For the identity function pij = δij for each i, j. We have
∑
j∈S
pij =
{
1 if i ∈ S
0 if i /∈ S
,
∑
j /∈S
|pij| =
{
0 if i ∈ S
1 if i /∈ S
.
Hence, ∑
j∈S
pij >
∑
j /∈S
|pij| ⇔ i ∈ S. (20)
This means that the followers of S under the identity function are the players of S and
only them, i.e.,
FId(S) = S
which confirms (3).
6 Boss and approval sets in the dynamic model
Using our dynamic model, we can also determine the boss and approval sets of command
games. We have the following:
Proposition 5 (i) S ⊆ N \ i is the boss set for agent i if and only if
∀e ∈ E,
∑
j∈S
pij >
∑
j /∈S
|pij|.
(ii) S ⊆ N \ i is the approval set for agent i if and only if
∀e ∈ E,
{∑
j∈S pij + pii >
∑
i 6=j /∈S |pij|∑
j∈S pij ≤
∑
j /∈S |pij|.
Proof: It is clear from the proof of Proposition 4. 
Proposition 5 provides simple conditions for determining boss sets and approval sets.
Boss sets for i are those sets S such that the algebraic sum of weights for agents in S is
greater than the sum of absolute values for the other agents. From Proposition 4, we see
that an agent follows his boss sets. The condition for approval sets shows that roughly
speaking, an approval set of i together with i has “more weight” than the remaining
agents, but it is not the case anymore if i’s weight is counted for the weights of agents
outside the approval set.
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Let us apply Proposition 5 to the majority influence function with t = ⌊n
2
⌋ + 1. We
have pij =
1
n
for each i, j. S is the boss set for agent i if and only if
∑
j∈S
pij >
∑
j /∈S
|pij| ⇔
|S|
n
>
n− |S|
n
⇔ |S| >
n
2
.
We have therefore
BossMaj
[t]
i =
{
S ⊆ N \ i : |S| >
n
2
}
which is coherent with (4).
S is the approval set for agent i if and only if
∀e ∈ E,
{∑
j∈S pij + pii >
∑
i 6=j /∈S |pij|∑
j∈S pij ≤
∑
j /∈S |pij|
⇔
{
|S|
n
+ 1
n
> n−|S|−1
n
|S|
n
≤ n−|S|
n
We have therefore
AppMaj
[t]
i =
{
S ⊆ N \ i : |S| = ⌊
n
2
⌋
}
which is coherent with (5).
Let k˜ be the guru. By virtue of Proposition 5(i) and (19), we have
BossGur
[k˜]
k˜
= ∅ and BossGur
[k˜]
k = {S ⊆ N \ k : k˜ ∈ S} for k 6= k˜.
Using Proposition 5(ii), we conclude that S is the approval set for agent i if and only if
pii = pk˜k˜ = 1. Hence, every set not containing k˜ is the approval set for k˜, and every agent
different from k˜ has the empty approval set:
AppGur
[k˜]
k˜
= 2N\k˜ and AppGur
[k˜]
k = ∅ for k 6= k˜.
We get therefore the results given in (6) and (7).
For the identity function, we have pij = δij for each i, j. Using Proposition 5(i) and
(20), we get BossIdi = ∅. By virtue of Proposition 5(ii), we conclude that S is the approval
set for agent i if and only if pii = 1, that is, each set not containing i is the approval set
for i. Hence, AppIdi = 2
N\i, which gives exactly (8).
7 Conclusions
The paper concerns the influence model originally introduced in Hoede and Bakker (1982)
and later studied and generalized in several works. We have proposed a new approach
to analyze the dynamic of the model. This approach is based on the use of differential
equations.
To be more precise, we have introduced a dynamic model of influence in which an
agent may give a certain importance to other agents in making his final decision. This
importance is reflected by a weight which, depending of the sign (positive, negative or
zero), corresponds to the stimulation, the inhibition or the absence of relation, respec-
tively. We have defined the exhortation obtained by an agent as the weighted sum of the
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opinions that the agent receives from the others. The updating rule is based on the sign
of the exhortation: its positive (negative) value means going to the positive (negative)
state, and the exhortation equal to zero corresponds to staying in the present state.
The main ideas of the application of this approach to the model of influence is to switch
to the continuum case and to apply some approximations allowing the use of differential
equations systems. The solutions of these systems give the same results obtained earlier
for the classical influence functions. It also leads to the results on followers obtained for
the discrete case, and to the results on the boss and approval sets of command games.
In the paper we have shown that if the majority function is used, then the decision of
each agent converges to the sign of the sum of the agents’ inclinations, and in case of the
guru function, the decision of each agent converges to the inclination of the guru. Under
the identity function, the agents’ decisions converge obviously to their own inclinations.
Furthermore, we have described the necessary and sufficient condition that an agent is the
follower of a coalition in the dynamic framework. We have used that result to determine
the sets of followers for the majority function, the guru function, and the identity function.
We have also determined the necessary and sufficient conditions that a coalition is the
boss set or the approval set for an agent in the dynamic model. We have applied these
results to determine the boss and approval sets of command games equivalent to the
three influence functions in question: the majority influence function, the guru function,
and the identity function. Both in the case of followers and boss and approval sets, the
conditions depend on the relation(s) between the weights that reflect the importance
given by the agents to the inclinations of the others in making their own decisions.
To the best of our knowledge, the differential equations approach has never been
applied before to the influence model in question and is also innovative with respect to
analysis of the influence framework in general. We believe that this approach can bring
new insights in the analysis of the dynamic aspects. Moreover, modeling positive and
negative influence in the same time by incorporating the importance weights that can be
of any sign increases significantly the applicability of the model.
In the paper, we aimed at introducing this new and useful framework of influence and
at studying the dynamic of the standard influence functions defined in the one-step yes-
no model of influence. Although we have focused on these classical influence functions,
we would like to stress that the approach allows the study of new concepts, like e.g. the
weighted majority function. In our future research on this model, we would like to deliver
a detailed analysis of the concepts that were not defined in the original yes-no model of
influence, but could be defined in the present stimulation-inhibition framework. There are
several possible research issues related to this model that could be raised. In the future
research on this framework, we would like to analyze, in particular, non-linear influence
functions and to consider temporary effects in the behavior of a group of agents.
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